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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory framework for electronic communications which entered into force in 2003 
introduced the 'Article 7 procedure' — an EU consultation mechanism which aims at ensuring 
a consistent regulatory approach within the EU. The recently revised telecoms rules
1 
confirmed the central role of the Article 7 procedure in promoting a competitive single market 
for electronic communications services. They give the Commission additional responsibilities 
for imposing and implementing remedies. This is intended to give market players greater legal 
certainty when they invest in telecoms across borders. 
Since 2003, telecoms markets have become more competitive and services and products 
increasingly accessible across Europe. This is partly the result of action by national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs), for example imposing access and pricing obligations on operators with 
significant market power (SMP), and partly because the Commission’s supervision of NRAs` 
draft regulatory measures has ensured a consistent approach to regulation across the EU. 
Regulation has undoubtedly become more focused on persistent bottlenecks, and regulatory 
procedures have become more streamlined and effective. 
However, problems remain. The single market for telecoms is far from being a reality and 
further efforts need to be made. Not all Member States are advancing at the same pace with 
their market reviews. Not all NRAs follow the appropriate regulatory approaches, especially 
when it comes to remedies for tackling competition problems. The resulting complex picture 
of competitive conditions that differ from one Member State to another thus continues to 
hamper the further development of the internal market. While incumbent operators generally 
still have SMP, particularly in upstream fixed telephony and broadband access markets, Next 
Generation Access (NGA) networks are being rolled out across Europe. Their deployment 
requires substantial investment, but the demand for services that need high-speed broadband 
connections remains uncertain. To foster investment and innovation, it is therefore necessary 
to provide regulatory certainty for investors while maintaining effective competition.  
This Communication presents the major trends and issues encountered since the 
Commission’s 2007 Communication on the market review process
2, up to the end of 2009. It 
shows how and to what extent the Commission’s oversight role under Article  7 of the 
Framework Directive
3 has been instrumental in working towards a single European telecoms 
market. Finally, it identifies several key areas in which the Commission may be required to 
provide further guidance to Europe’s telecoms regulators to ensure a level of consistency and 
predictability that will give market players the confidence to further invest in the EU market. 
2.  PROGRESS ON MARKET ANALYSES 
NRAs have made uneven progress with their market analyses under Article  7 of the 
Framework Directive. Some have started their third round reviews, while others are still in the 
first round
4. The Commission has reviewed more than 1000 notifications from NRAs and 
                                                 
1  The revised EU telecoms rules, adopted on 25.11.2009, to be transposed by 25.05.2011. (See OJ L 337, 
18.12.2009, p. 37.). 
2  COM(2007)401 dd. 11.07.2007. 
3  Directive 2002/21/EC, OJ L 108, 24.4.2002. 
4  An overview can be found in Annexes II, III and IV of the Staff Working Document (SWD). EN  4     EN 
issued comments on about 60 % of them. In about 4 % of cases, NRAs withdrew their notified 
draft measure after receiving reasoned advice from the Commission. In less than 1 % of all 
cases the Commission objected to the intended regulation
5. The Commission has always 
responded to NRAs’ draft measures in order to provide guidance and ensure a consistent yet 
appropriately nuanced regulatory approach across Europe. Experience shows that, on balance, 
NRAs take due account of this guidance.
6 
3.  MORE STREAMLINED AND FOCUSED REGULATION 
Ongoing technological developments and the enforcement of telecoms regulation in the 
Member States have, over the years, lowered market entry barriers and enabled alternative 
operators to increasingly constrain the market power of SMP operators. To re-focus 
regulatory efforts and resources on key competition bottlenecks, it was necessary to re-
evaluate the 2003 Recommendation on relevant markets
7 and to further streamline the Article 
7 procedure. 
A key insight of the 2007 Communication on the market review process was that the Article 7 
procedure had been particularly successful in ensuring a consistent interpretation of where 
regulation is appropriate, but less successful in identifying which regulation is needed. Since 
then, however, several NRAs have found that, within certain telecoms markets, effective 
competition came to some geographical areas sooner than others. The question as to where 
regulation is appropriate was thus raised again. 
Regulatory remedies still vary across Europe, even where the underlying market problems are 
very similar. This is a serious impediment to achieving a true single market. In particular, 
NRAs continue to apply divergent price-setting methodologies when regulating key access 
products that enable alternative operators to compete against the dominant undertakings 
which own most of the access infrastructure. The Commission has urged NRAs to use 
appropriate cost-accounting methods and to consult the actual level of regulated access prices 
across the EU.
8 
3.1.  Commission guidance under the Article 7 procedure — cross-cutting issues 
3.1.1.  Geographical differentiation 
Regulation of wholesale inputs for broadband services has allowed competitors to invest in 
their own infrastructure (LLU
9), and this has led to more competition, particularly in densely 
populated areas. Some NRAs have considered regionally differentiated competitive 
conditions when defining the geographical market, and have adjusted their regulation to take 
account of those differences between sub-national markets. Other NRAs have considered such 
differences when imposing remedies. To ensure a consistent approach to identifying genuine 
differences in competitive conditions, the Commission has advised NRAs to define separate 
                                                 
5  In nearly 3 % of the cases the Commission opened an additional assessment period (Phase II). 
6  An overview of the Article 7 procedure can be found in Annex I. 
7  Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC, OJ L 114, 8.5.2003. 
8  LT/2009/0990, SI/2009/1010, SE/2009/1018, DK/2009/1023. 
9 Local  loop  unbundling. EN  5     EN 
geographical markets only when the competitive conditions in different geographical areas, 
and the boundaries between these areas, are stable over time.
10 
3.1.2.  Functional separation and commitments 
Discussions on different forms of business separation of incumbent operators have been 
increasing in a number of Member States
11. Under the current EU telecoms rules, NRAs can, 
in exceptional circumstances, impose remedies other than traditional access-related 
obligations, if authorised by the Commission. One such remedy is functional separation, 
which requires a dominant network operator to separate organisationally its network and its 
service provider businesses. The Commission has been stressing that commitments offered by 
SMP operators and accepted by NRAs, insofar as they aim at enforcing, modifying or 
replacing existing regulatory obligations, must be considered as directly related and/or 
ancillary to those existing regulatory obligations. As such, they must be subject to national 
and EU consultations before adoption, to ensure the transparency of the process and an 
adequate involvement of all stakeholders. NRAs must also ensure that separation 
commitments do not negatively affect investment by the incumbent and new entrants, and that 
alternative operators have at least the same access possibilities under a commitment-driven 
approach as under a purely regulatory approach. 
3.2.  Commission initiatives under Article 19 of the Framework Directive 
3.2.1.  Procedural Recommendation 
In 2008 the Commission adopted a revised Procedural Recommendation
12 to reduce the 
administrative burden of the regulatory process. To increase legal certainty for NRAs and 
market players and to ensure a timely implementation of regulatory measures, the revised 
Recommendation invites NRAs to notify simultaneously the market analysis and the 
(withdrawal of) remedies. To streamline procedures for NRAs and the Commission, it allows 
NRAs to use a 'short form' to notify four types of measures
13. In principle the Commission 
will not comment on such notifications. 
Since then, the Commission has received mostly short notification forms for markets that are 
no longer listed in the Recommendation on relevant markets and where the NRA considered 
that the market no longer warrants ex ante regulation.
14 In one of these cases the Commission 
nonetheless urged the regulator to mandate an appropriate period of notice before actually 
withdrawing the existing obligations.
15 Only a few cases related solely to changes in the 
technical details of a remedy.
16 
                                                 
10  UK/2007/0733, PT/2008/0851, ES/2008/0805, FI/2009/0900. 
11  UK, SE, SL, IT, PL, PT. 
12  Commission Recommendation 2008/850/EC, OJ L 301, 12.11.2008. 
13  Namely, decisions (i) to de-regulate markets no longer listed in Recommendation 2003/311/EC; (ii) not 
to regulate markets included in the Recommendation but which remain effectively competitive; (iii) 
amendments to technical details of a previously imposed remedy; and (iv) the extension of existing 
measures to another market player in a similar situation. 
14  e.g. ES/2008/0817, PL/2008/0831, CZ/2008/0840, NL/2008/0849, CZ/2008/0857, CZ/2009/0872, 
SI/2009/0893, SK/2009/0954, SE/2009/0968, PL/2009/0971, FI/2009/0985, IT/2009/0998, 
IT/2009/0999, SK//2009/1008, DK/2009/1024. 
15 IT/2009/0999. 
16  e.g. IT/2008/0842, BE/2009/0882, UK/2009/0901, IE/2009/0928, PT/2009/0956, RO/2009/1003, 
PT/2009/1011, PT/2009/1012, FR/2009/1028. EN  6     EN 
3.2.2.  Termination Rates Recommendation 
Termination rates are on a downward trend, yet there are still large gaps between mobile 
termination rates
17 and between fixed and mobile termination rates. The Commission's 
assessment of notifications regarding these markets revealed that these discrepancies are often 
due to differing regulatory approaches in terms of price control types, costing methodologies, 
the treatment of asymmetries and the implementation of glide paths. In its comment letters, 
the Commission therefore consistently invited NRAs to work towards the application of a 
coherent cost-accounting method, to apply a forward-looking long-run incremental cost model 
to bring termination rates down to a level reflecting the cost of an efficient operator, and to 
establish without delay glide paths to symmetric termination rates, so as to continue 
encouraging operators to become efficient as quickly as possible.  
To consolidate these principles, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on the 
Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU
18, giving general 
guidance on this issue. This Recommendation sets out clear costing principles to be applied 
by NRAs when calculating termination rates. It states that termination rates should be set at 
the level of efficient costs as from 31 December 2012 at the latest, although less well-
resourced NRAs may apply alternative methodologies aiming at the recommended objective 
until 1 July 2014. 
4.  REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
4.1.  Fixed retail access and wholesale call origination 
4.1.1.  Market definition 
The Recommendation on relevant markets no longer distinguishes between residential and 
non-residential customers in the retail fixed access market since, in most Member States, 
contractual terms do not differ significantly between the two types of access. Nevertheless, 
the Commission has accepted the need to maintain this distinction in some countries
19 in view 
of particular national market circumstances. When it comes to including broadband access 
services in the retail access market, the Commission has pointed out
20 that NRAs must 
demonstrate that unbundled broadband and narrowband access products are substitutes, 
especially in terms of their function and their pricing structure. The Commission has 
expressed its doubts on the inclusion of wholesale access services in the wholesale call 
origination market, as access services complement rather than substitute call origination 
services.
21  
4.1.2.  Remedies 
In both of the above markets, incumbents still have around 90 % market share in almost all 
Member States. The Commission was concerned with the effectiveness of both retail and 
                                                 
17  BG/2009/866 and MTR Benchmark Snapshot, ERG (09) 23_final_090604. 
18  Commission Recommendation 2009/396/EC, OJ L 124. 
19  AT, BG, FR, IT, NL, UK. 
20  IT/2009/0890, DE/2009/0897, BG/2009/0911, SE/2009/0965, RO/2009/1001. 
21 DK/2005/0141,  NL/2008/0822. EN  7     EN 
wholesale regulation
22 and stressed that NRAs should analyse the effects of existing 
wholesale remedies when assessing the need for retail regulation. Carrier (pre-)selection and 
wholesale line rental (WLR) are imposed in most Member States either in the access or in the 
call origination market. WLR allows alternative operators to climb the investment ladder 
towards full unbundling and to bundle their offers in the retail markets. Where WLR was not 
imposed or properly implemented
23, the Commission invited the NRAs
24 to reconsider this 
obligation. 
In its comment letters, the Commission mainly addressed the proposed price control and cost 
accounting remedies.
25 It invited NRAs to impose or maintain price control obligations where 
wholesale regulation had not yet proved sufficient to ensure competition at retail level
26 or 
where there was a risk of overpricing by the SMP operator
27. In several cases, comments 
concerned the lack of detail in the notifications
28, as this fails to ensure adequate transparency 
and legal certainty for market players. In addition, the Commission commented on the 
differentiation of the transparency obligation within the same relevant market
29 as well as on 
the non-imposition of accounting separation
30. In one case, the Commission reminded the 
NRA that commitments offered by the incumbent, replacing or supplementing existing 
remedies or introducing new ones, must be notified under the EU consultation procedure.
31 
4.2.  Fixed and mobile termination 
4.2.1.  Market definition 
NRAs continue to define each individual fixed and mobile network operator as a distinct 
relevant market for call termination and have also consistently found SMP. In mobile 
telephony, some NRAs have identified relevant call termination markets for mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs) where such operators can determine their commercial terms and 
conditions for termination independently of their host networks
32. 
4.2.2.  Remedies 
Both in its comment letters and its Termination Rates Recommendation, the Commission has 
urged NRAs to set termination rates at the cost of an efficient operator
33, thus implying a 
symmetric level
34. In particular, the Commission pointed to the use of a forward-looking 
                                                 
22  CZ/2006/0356, EE/2007/0637-638, DE/2006/0402, SK/2007/0676, SK/2007/0696 and AT/2007/0579-
580, NL/2008/0821, BG/2009/0911, LV/2009/0960, MT/2009/0979, LV/2009/0994. 
23  e.g. DK, EE, DE, HU, LV, SK, AT, CZ. 
24  EE/2007/0637-638, HU/2007/0662-663, SK/2007/0740, LV/2009/0960, LV/2009/0994, 
RO/2009/1001-1002, DE/2009/1006. 
25  e.g. ES/2008/0815, LU/2006/0526-527, BE/2007/0640, DE/2006/0402, IE/2007/0632, AT/2006/0543, 
CZ/2006/0351, SK/2007/0740, UK/2009/0898,DE/2009/1006. 
26 EE/2007/0637-638,  SK/2007/0696.  . 
27 ES/2008/0815,  CZ/2008/0755. 
28  LV/2007/0565-566, GI/2007/0710-711, EE/2007/0637-638, IE/2007/0632, PL/2006/0380, 
GI/2007/0716, LV/2009/0994. 
29 ES/2008/0815. 
30  DE/2006/0402, LV/2007/0565-566, SK/2007/0696, LV/2009/0994. 
31 IT/2009/0890. 
32  ES/2007/0706, DE/2008/0813, DK/2009/1014. 
33  FR/2007/0669, FI/2008/0778, IT/2008/0779, PL/2008/0794, DK/2009/1014, GI/2009/0976-0977. 
34  ES/2007/0598, PT/2007/0707, DK/2008/0785, GI/2009/0976, PL/2009/0996. EN  8     EN 
LRIC
35 model
36 and underlined that glide paths towards an efficient rate should be set without 
delay
37 and notified under the Article 7 procedure
38. In seeking to define relevant costs, the 
Commission continued to highlight the importance of LRIC models using the current costs of 
an efficient operator employing efficient technology
39. Furthermore, the Commission 
underlined that relevant costs considered for wholesale call termination charging purposes are 
typically the additional costs involved in providing the service
40. NRAs are increasingly 
committing themselves to apply the costing approach set out in the Commission’s 
Termination Rates Recommendation
41. 
4.3.  Wholesale broadband markets 
4.3.1.  Market definition 
The efficient roll-out of NGA networks is, as highlighted in the Digital Agenda
42, a priority 
for the Commission. NGA deployment had a particularly strong impact on market definition 
—both in the market for wholesale fixed network infrastructure access, including shared or 
fully unbundled access (LLU), and in the market for wholesale broadband access (WBA). 
This was because NRAs had to decide on the inclusion of access products based on different 
types of infrastructure (FttN
43, FttH
44 or VDSL). 
The Commission has repeatedly held that, where similar services can be provided over both 
copper and fibre networks, both should be regarded as substitutes and part of the same 
relevant market. Accordingly, where NRAs decided to include fibre-based access products in 
the definition of the LLU and WBA markets
45, the Commission endorsed this inclusion. 
Where NRAs excluded such products
46, this was in general due to factors such as the lack of 
(an extensive) fibre access network deployment. In such cases, the Commission called on the 
NRAs to monitor market developments, taking into account the increasing availability of fibre 
networks and operators' rollout plans.
47 
A recurrent issue was the inclusion of cable in the WBA market, on the basis of direct
48 or 
indirect constraints
49. The Commission acknowledged that, even in the absence of a relevant 
wholesale cable access offer, competition at the retail level from vertically integrated 
undertakings could exert an indirect constraint, but that this constraint should not usually alter 
                                                 
35  Long run incremental cost. 
36  BG/2009/0866, DK/2009/0914, CZ/2009/0959, SE/2009/1018. 
37 IE/2008/0746,  CZ/2009/0959. 
38 DE/2008/0813. 
39  UK/2006/0498, EL/2008/0786, IT/2008/0802, PL/2009/0991. 
40  EL/2008/0786, IT/2008/0802, SE/2009/0941, DK/2009/1014. 
41  FR/2008/812, IT/2008/0802 (hereafter regulator committed to adopt a cost model in line with the 
Recommendation by 2010), BG/2009/0865, BG/2009/0866, RO/2009/0878, AT/2009/0910. 
42  On 19 May 2010, under the umbrella of the Europe 2020 strategy (COM (2010) 2020), the Commission 
adopted a Digital Agenda for Europe. 
43  Fibre to the Node/Cabinet. 
44  Fibre to the Home/Building. 
45  E.g. EE/2009/0942, FI/2008/0839, FR/2008/0780, IE/2009/0875, NL/2008/827, PT/20080850 (LLU 
market); BE/2007/0736 and BE/2009/0950, EE/2009/0943, FI/2009/0900, FR/2008/0781, 
NL/2008/0827, PT/2008/0851 (WBA market). . 
46  E.g. CY/2009/0869, CZ/2009/0933 withdrawn by NRA, DK/2008/0860, EL/2009/0934, SK/2009/0929 
withdrawn by NRA (LLU market); CY/2009/0870, CZ/2008/0797, EL/2009/0935 (WBA market). 
47  e.g. AT/2009/0970, CY/2009/0870, CZ/2008/0797, EL/2009/0935. 
48 MT/2008/0803. 
49  More details can be found in Chapter 5.1 of Annex III in the SWD. EN  9     EN 
the market definition and should, instead, be taken into account in the context of the SMP 
assessment.
50 In one case, given present national circumstances, the Commission accepted the 
inclusion of mobile broadband connections in the residential retail broadband market as a 
direct substitute for xDSL and cable broadband access products. This allowed the 
deregulation of the wholesale broadband access market as regards the supply of broadband 
connections to residential customers.
51 
4.3.2.  Remedies 
The LLU market was found to be non-competitive and is regulated in all Member States that 
have notified it. The WBA market was found to be non-competitive in almost all Member 
States with the exception of Malta
52. In the UK and Portugal, the market was geographically 
segmented and parts of the national territory were found to be effectively competitive.  
As with the proper delineation of markets, the most important developments with regard to 
remedies are linked to the deployment of NGAs. In the LLU market, some NRAs put in place 
obligations to ensure access to the sub-loop, ancillary services (co-location) and appropriate 
backhaul in the FttN scenario
53. As regards access to FttH, some NRAs mandated unbundled 
access to fibre loops
54 at cost-oriented prices, including a risk premium
55. Two NRAs 
proposed to mandate access to in-house wiring on all operators rolling out fibre lines into the 
homes of consumers, regardless of whether these operators have SMP. This is known as 
'symmetric' regulation.
56 Another significant development is the proposal to oblige the 
incumbent to grant access to civil works infrastructure
57. Some Member States also explicitly 
addressed the issue of transparency
58 and of migration from copper to fibre networks
59. Where 
this was not the case
60, the Commission invited the NRAs to develop remedies spelling out 
the details of the migration process, since business cases for alternative operators are 
substantially affected by this migration and by the dismantling of exchanges. In any event, the 
variety of approaches followed by NRAs underlines the need for further guidance by the 
Commission. 
In the WBA market, some NRAs imposed limited or no remedies on certain networks or 
functionalities, considering the obligations imposed in the LLU market.
61 Here the 
Commission emphasised the need to monitor the market to ascertain whether remedies 
imposed in the LLU market are sufficient to produce effective competition at retail level and, 
if not, to impose the appropriate remedies in the WBA market.  
An examination of the methodologies applied for defining cost orientation has shown that the 
NRAs` approaches differ unnecessarily. What is needed here is a more coherent approach, to 
regulatory accounting for key inputs across Europe. 
4.4.  Leased lines 
                                                 
50 e.g. UK/2007/0733, DK/2008/0862. 
51 AT/2009/0970. 
52 MT/2008/0803. 
53 e.g.DE/2007/0646,  BE/2008/0801,  SI/2009/0957. 
54 NL/2008/0826,  SI/2009/0957. 
55 NL/2009/0868,  SI/2009/0957. 
56 ES/2008/0820,  FR/2009/993. 
57  e.g.FR/2008/0780, EE/2009/0942, ES/2008/0804, PT/2008/0851, IT/2009/0891. 
58  e.g. FR, ES, EL. 
59  e.g. BE, ES, NL, DK, EE. 
60 e.g.  FI/2008/0839,  IT/2009/0988. 
61 e.g.NL/2008/0827. EN  10     EN 
4.4.1.  Market definition 
Functioning leased line markets are important for competition and NGA deployment. The 
precise delineation between the trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is highly 
dependent on the topology of each national network. Some NRAs segmented wholesale 
terminating segments of leased lines according to bandwidth
62. Other NRAs instead identified 
significant geographical variations in competitive conditions and proposed to define separate 
geographical markets
63. One NRA
64 segmented terminating segments of leased lines 
according to their intended use and proposed to deregulate leased lines connecting with base 
stations of mobile network operators. The Commission accepted that it was technologically 
neutral to include in the market definition wholesale leased lines with alternative interfaces, 
such as Ethernet-based products that are functionally equivalent to traditional interfaces in 
terms of their capacity and connectivity to leased lines.
65 
4.4.2.  Remedies 
All NRAs that notified the market for terminating segments of leased lines found that the 
fixed incumbent operator had SMP
66. The Commission stressed that the scope of the proposed 
obligations should be limited to remedying the lack of competition in the market concerned.
67 
Regulatory obligations should not be imposed for too long a period if competitive conditions 
are likely to improve in the short or medium term
68. On price control obligations, the 
Commission recommended direct regulatory intervention rather than self-regulation by the 
incumbent operator
69. With regard to the markets assessed as competitive, the Commission 
stressed that regulatory obligations should be withdrawn only after a transition period long 
enough to enable operators to eliminate remaining bottlenecks in their networks.
70 
4.5.  Outlook 
The revised EU telecoms rules will give the Commission additional responsibilities with 
regard to the imposition and implementation of remedies by NRAs. In ensuring that the EU 
regulatory framework is applied consistently, the Commission will work closely with the 
newly created Body of European Regulators in Electronic Communications (BEREC), in 
order to develop a single market for electronic communications services, to the benefit of 
consumers and businesses. 
The Article 7 procedure has allowed the Commission to identify areas where more focused 
regulation is desirable, where new forms of regulation seem to be emerging and where 
withdrawal of regulation could be possible. In this context, the Article 7 procedure provides 
key insights for the Commission’s regular review of the Recommendation on relevant 
markets. However, the Article 7 procedure has also shown that NRAs are still applying 
divergent approaches to similar competition problems. This impedes the development of a 
true single market. Examples include the imposition and implementation of WLR, the 
                                                 
62  LT/2006/0430, EL/2006/0422, UK/2008/0747, UK/2008/0787, NL/2008/0823, AT/2008/0836. 
63 UK/2008/0787,  AT/2008/0836. 
64 IT/2009/1000. 
65  e.g. EE/2007/0643, DE/2007/0677. 
66  One NRA found no SMP on a more narrowly defined market for very high capacity terminating 
segments of leased lines, i.e. UK/2008/0787. Another NRA found SMP only on the low capacity leased 
lines market, i.e. LT/2006/0430. 
67 NL/2008/0823-0825. 
68 UK/2008/0859. 
69 EE/2007/0643. 
70 IT/2009/0999-1000. EN  11     EN 
treatment of fibre access products in wholesale broadband markets and the application of 
costing methodologies for calculating access or interconnection charges. The Article 7 
procedure has also revealed that regulatory approaches are evolving on the basis of separation 
commitments by incumbents in markets where traditional obligations have been found 
insufficient to tackle persistent market failures. This shows that NRAs need further guidance 
on regulatory principles to avoid a patchwork of approaches across the EU, as this would 
hamper the further integration of markets across borders. The Commission is currently 
finalising its Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA), which builds on Commission guidance provided in the frame of national broadband 
market reviews. The Commission, together with BEREC, may need to provide further 
guidance to NRAs on the consistent implementation of separation commitments and 
remedies. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
By ensuring focused and consistent telecoms regulation in the EU, the Article 7 procedure 
remains key to promoting a single market for electronic communications services. The 
transparency built into the Article 7 consultation mechanism has already allowed it to provide 
very helpful guidance to NRAs. While notifying regulators generally took the utmost account 
of Commission comments, other NRAs have used them as guidance for their own regulatory 
strategies. This was particularly true when it came to defining product and geographical 
markets and assessing the competitive conditions in relevant markets. In addition, the revised 
Recommendation on relevant markets and the new Procedural Recommendation have 
streamlined the regulatory process and focused the efforts of NRAs and the Commission on 
those markets where bottlenecks persist. To achieve greater consistency in applying remedies, 
the Commission has adopted the Recommendation on the regulatory treatment of mobile and 
fixed termination rates in the EU and is currently finalising its Recommendation on regulated 
access to Next Generation Access Networks. Finally, the telecoms reform package gives the 
Commission and BEREC additional responsibilities pertaining to the imposition and 
implementation of remedies. This will further facilitate the development of a single market for 
electronic communications.  
 